Over-education for the rich vs under-education for the poor: a search-theoretic microfoundation by Charlot, Olivier & Decreuse, Bruno
Over-education for the rich vs under-education for the
poor: a search-theoretic microfoundation
Olivier Charlot, Bruno Decreuse
To cite this version:
Olivier Charlot, Bruno Decreuse. Over-education for the rich vs under-education for the poor:
a search-theoretic microfoundation. 2006. <halshs-00409583>
HAL Id: halshs-00409583
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00409583
Submitted on 10 Aug 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
        GREQAM 
   Groupement de Recherche en Economie 
Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III 
Document de Travail 




OVER-EDUCATION FOR THE RICH VS 






























Over-education for the rich vs under-education for
the poor: a search-theoretic microfoundation
Olivier CHARLOT
LIBRE, Université de Franche-Comté
Bruno DECREUSE
GREQAM, Université de la Méditerranée
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Abstract: This paper provides a search-theoretic microfoundation to the popular view
according to which rich but poorly talented individuals crowd out poorer and more
talented individuals from schooling. We consider a two-sector, two schooling level
matching model of unemployment with ex-post rent-sharing. Individuals diﬀer in
ability and schooling cost, the search market is segmented by education, and there
is free entry of new firms in each sector. Self-selection in education originates com-
position eﬀects in the distribution of skills across sectors. This in turn modifies
the intensity of job creation, implying the private and social returns to schooling
always diﬀer. Agents with large schooling costs — the poor — select themselves too
much, while there is too little self-selection among the low schooling cost individuals
— the rich. We also show that education should, on average, be more taxed than
subsidized.
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